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programs  [that]  typically  involve  consortia  that  include  commercially  oriented  firms.    The 
research agenda is negotiated with industry and aims to address the common needs of both the 
commercial  and  military  sector.    Industry  cost‐shares  the  project.    The  ‘agreements’  are 
negotiated outside the Federal regulations for grants or contracts.  This is particularly important 
because it frees firms from having to provide specified cost‐and‐accounting data and allows more 
flexibility  in negotiating  technical data  rights. …The projects also  tend  to address  technologies 




















































































































  Richard Van Atta  thought  it  important  to provide a more micro‐insight on  the 
zeitgeist  of  the  time.    Van  Atta  spoke  about  the  sense  of  urgency  felt  by  the 
semiconductor  industry  and  which  was more  demonstrated  by  the  tireless  work  of 
semiconductor  luminaries, Bob Noyce and  Jack Kilby.   These men,  the co‐inventors of 
the micro‐circuit, were very  concerned about  the precipitous  state of  the  industry  so 
much  so  that  they  wanted  to  find  a  mechanism  for  getting  the  focus  of  national 







Justice. Van Atta  recalled how he  and Bob Burmeister brought many of  the principal 
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the  intellectual  interests of  their competitors over such  issues as proprietary products 
and proprietary processes.  This reasonable paranoia was hindering the advancement of 
a coordinated response to the loss of competitiveness. The auspicious meeting and the 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13  The Defense Science Board was established in 1956 in response to recommendations of the Hoover 
Commission:  
"The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development) will appoint a standing committee, reporting directly to 
him, of outstanding basic and applied scientists. This committee will canvass periodically the needs and opportunities 
presented by new scientific knowledge for radically new weapons systems."  
The Board operates by forming Task Forces consisting of Board members and other consultants/experts to address those 
tasks referred to it by formal direction. The products of each Task Force typically consist of a set of formal briefings to the 
Board and appropriate DOD officials, and a written report containing findings, recommendations and a suggested 
implementation plan. The Board reports directly to the Secretary of Defense through the USD (AT&L) while, at the same 
time, working in close coordination with the DDR&E to develop and strengthen the Department's research and 









    ♦ U.S. military forces depend heavily on technological superiority to win. 
    ♦ Electronics is the technology that can be leveraged most highly. 
    ♦ Semiconductors are the key to leadership in electronics. 
    ♦ Competitive, high‐volume production is the key to leadership in semiconductors. 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Bob Burmeister, he and I were talking about, well, what can we do about getting this thing going?  And 
I will give Burmeister the credit for saying, “Why don’t we hold it at a government facility, and invite 
them to come?  And that would give them the cover to come, because it’s not individual companies, et 
cetera.  And it provides a safe haven relative to the public press, et cetera.”  Because these guys were 
coming together for the first time.   
 
So we, meaning IDA, through various contacts, got facilities at the Naval Postgraduate School in ’87, or 
whenever it is.  I’d have to go check the calendar.  And actually, through SIA, got them to invite all of 
the companies that were signing up to participate in Sematech.   
 
And I can’t remember exactly whether that was before or after, or what the actual legislation, (I believe 
Van Atta is referring to the Bay-Dole Act)  et cetera.  But it was very early.  And we literally held the 
first meeting of Sematech at the Naval Postgraduate School.  And the interesting thing was, each 
company that came—IBM, Intel, TI, et cetera—as far as I could tell, their CEOs had never met each 
other because they were competitors, and they hated each other.  Or, they – here were competitors, and 
they didn’t really spend much time together for legal anti-trust reasons didn’t want to spend much time 
with each other.   
 
But – and they all came to this auditorium at the Naval Postgraduate School.  And they all sat quite 
distant from each other.  Each CEO, CTO, and their corporate lawyer were completely separate from 
each other, sitting around this auditorium, with lots of space between them.   
 
And then the interesting thing is, after the introductions, after the discussion, the DOD guys got up.  
And I can’t remember who – whether it was Sumney or Maynard or whoever from DOD, but DOD 
guys said, you know, we’re glad you’re here.  Here’s what we’re trying to do. 
 
And then we basically had them start to talk.  And what they basically said is, well, I have this problem 
in terms of dealing with my suppliers and with my manufacturing.  And then another guy would say, 
well, I have that problem too.  Or, do you have that problem too?  Well – and they went back and forth.  
And then by the second hour, all of the CEOs and CTOs were sitting down together as a group, shoulder 
to shoulder, interacting and discussing, and all the lawyers walking around the back with nothing to do, 
and they finally all just got up and left.  Because they realized that, one, they could be there, and two, 
they had mutual interest, and three, they really started getting down and talking about, well, what do – 
what are we focusing on, or how do we do it?   
 
And so, that first meeting became the icebreaker that would get them all really start to interact.  And 
from there I could go find out what happened next, but it was kind of like the kickoff of the whole thing.  
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APPENDIX B 
Fong’s Five Typologies (Fong 2000, 159‐ 160). 
1) By‐Product Model  
In this by‐product model, the conduct of defense research is exclusively guided by 
mission agency military requirements.  Commercial spin‐offs are not avoided and may 
become quite significant.  But any such by‐products are unintended from a policy 
planning perspective, and are considered beyond the consideration of DoD. 
2) Intentional Spin‐Off Model 
In this approach, commercial spillovers are expressly contemplated during program 
planning….In this intentional spin‐off model, defense research remains overwhelmingly 
guided by military needs.  And the actual “harvesting” of anticipated commercial 
benefits is considered beyond the Pentagon’s jurisdiction, and is left to the efforts of the 
private sector. 
3) Explicit Dual‐Use Model  
In this model, defense technology projects have the express purpose of benefiting 
commercial as well as military needs.  Projects focus on a level of technical work that is 
generic to both the military and civilian sectors. Although technologies developed in the 
first two models may indeed have a dual‐use utility, this third approach pursues such 
technologies explicitly and programmatically.  This explicit intent, as well as balancing 
between military and commercial objectives, defines this category more narrowly for 
this analysis than more general uses of the “dual use” term. 
4) Industrial Base Model  
In this approach, the commercial orientation of defense programs, at least 
operationally, exceeds the defense orientation. One purpose of industrial base 
programs remains military benefits, namely, access to leading‐edge technologies and 
capabilities.  But in this model, such benefits are gained only after commercial 
technology and civilian industrial advances are supported by DOD.  The commercial and 
civilian focuses of such programs are justified on the grounds that it is necessary to 
establish or bolster the civilian technology and industrial base so that spin‐ons can 
accrue to the defense technology base. 
5) Economic Competitiveness Model  
In this approach, any vestige of national security or other mission agency rationale is 
jettisoned, and unabashed support is given to commercial technology.  Such purely 
civilian oriented technology policy is usually associated with R&D programs of U.S. 
economic rivals in Asia and Europe.    
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APPENDIX C 
Interview Questions 
1) Sematech might have failed in at least three instances, its initial difficulty in appointing a 
CEO, the switching of the research agenda, and later in its life when SEMATECH 
developed machinery became available to non‐members, magnifying the free rider 
problem.  What specific mechanisms or processes did DARPA engage in to help 
SEMATECH overcome these difficult situations? 
2) What else did DARPA do that ensured the success of the SEMATECH project? 
3) SEMATECH invested quite a bit of time and effort to create mechanisms and processes 
to ensure cooperation concerning agenda, authority and accountability amongst the 
industrial members of the project. What specific mechanisms and processes were 
created by either DARPA or SEMATECH to ensure cooperation with DARPA? Were these 
mechanisms successful? If so, how? If these mechanisms were not successful, why 
weren’t they? 
4) There is second source evidence indicating that DARPA and some of the industrial 
members of SEMATECH had a great deal of interest in advancing research and 
development of ASICS and X‐ray lithography. These particular efforts do not seem to 
have made it to the SEMATECH research agenda.  Why is this? 
5) At one point the government proposed reducing its annual contribution to SEMATECH 
by 20 million dollars. Funding was eventually approved at the full budgetary amount. 
Was this a way for DARPA to express its dissatisfaction with the SEMATECH project? 
6) During the development and operation of the SEMATECH project, there was a shift in 
national research policy towards more of a spin on model.  The Clinton Administration 
endorsed the SEMATECH project as a model for government industry partnerships.  Is 
the SEMATECH model a good model?  What are its strengths?  What are its 
weaknesses? How should those weaknesses be addressed? 
7) Are there lessons from the SEMATECH project that would apply to other government 
organizations concerning their decisions to join, remain in, or terminate a GIP or 
research consortium? 
8) Is there anyone else I should talk to?  
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APPENDIX D 
The documents provided in this appendix demonstrate that SEMATECH is now engaged 
in research that focuses on different semiconductor substrates, “thin Silicon‐On‐
Insulator” (SOI) and on alternative forms of lithography such as Extreme Ultraviolet Light 
(EUV).  X‐Ray technology was on the forefront of DARPA’s research interests, however 
EUV is one of several alternative lithography technologies that DARPA and other 
government agencies had interest in during the years that SEMATECH received direct 
funds from DARPA.   
This information can be accessed at: 
http://www.pascaltechnologies.com/files%5CTech.Docs%5CThe%20Semiconductor%20I
ndustrys%20Path%20to%20Survival%20and%20Growth%20Polcari_2005.PDF
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APPENDIX E 
 
The material presented in this appendix is meant to demonstrate the significant 
progress in the research of alternative forms of lithography made by SEMATECH, 
especially Extreme Ultraviolet Light Lithography.   
  This information may be accessed at: 
http://www.sematech.org/research/litho/documents/Litho_Overview.pdf 
